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Border-induced displacement:  
The ethical and legal implications  
of distance-creation through externalization 
 
Violeta Moreno-Lax* – Martin Lemberg-Pedersen** 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction: The role of distance 
 
The externalization of European border control can be defined as 
the range of processes whereby European actors and Member States 
complement policies to control migration across their territorial bound-
aries with initiatives that realize such control extra-territorially and 
through other countries and organs rather than their own. The phe-
nomenon has multiple dimensions. The spatial dimension captures the 
remoteness of the geographical distance that is interposed between the 
locus of power and the locus of surveillance. But there is also a relation-
al dimension, regarding the multiplicity of actors engaged in the venture 
through bilateral and multilateral interactions, usually through coercive 
dynamics of conditional reward, incentive, or penalization. And there 
are functional and instrumental dimensions too, concerning the cost-
effectiveness of distance-creation (in both ethical and legal grounds) vis-
à-vis the (unwanted) migrant, who, removed from sight, is no longer 
considered of concern to the supervising State,1 and the range of exter-
nalizing policy devices at the service of externalising agents in terms of 
 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Queen Mary University of London, and 
Visiting Professor, College of Europe. 
** Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Department of Culture and Glob-
al Studies, University of Aalborg. 
1 The ‘where’ of borders matters and determines access to protection. See eg M 
Dikeç, ‘The “Where” of Asylum’ (2009) 27 Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 183; P Novak, ‘The Neoliberal Location of Asylum’ (2019) 70 Political Geogra-
phy 1. 
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purpose, format, delivery, and ultimate control.2 European borders thus 
(re-)emerge as ubiquitous, multi-modal and translational systems of co-
ercion – as an interconnected network of ‘little Guantánamos’.3 This, in 
turn, creates a distance, both physically and ethically, that is utilized to 
shift away concomitant responsibilities.4  
Distance, as the next sections will demonstrate, plays a crucial role 
as a mechanism not only of dispersion of legal duties, blurring the lines 
of causation and making attribution of wrongful conduct a difficult 
task, but also as an artefact of oppression and displacement in itself. It 
does not prevent (unwanted) migration but rather makes it unviable 
through legally sanctioned, safe channels, diverting it through ever more 
perilous routes. The immediate effect of this distance that externaliza-
tion engenders is at least threefold. First, it leads to the disempower-
ment of migrants, who are left with no options for safe and legal escape, 
being instead coerced into dangerous courses operated by smugglers. 
Second, it legitimizes the actors enforcing externalized control on be-
half, and for the benefit, of the European Union and its Member States. 
Repressive forces in third countries gain standing as valid interlocutors 
for cooperation, as a result; their democratic and human rights creden-
tials becoming secondary, if at all relevant, as the Libyan case illustrates 
below. Third, legal alternatives, like the relaxation of controls or the 
creation of safe and regular pathways, are rejected; perceived as an il-
logical concession to the failure of the externalization project. 
The final outcome, and what constitutes the focus of this contribu-
tion, is the ‘border-induced displacement’ effect,5 resulting from the 
combination of the processes of extraterritorialisation and externaliza-
tion taken together. Border-induced displacement is not equivalent to 
 
2 On this multi-dimensional taxonomy of externalization, see R Zaiotti, ‘Mapping 
Remote Control: The Externalization of Migration Management in the 21st Century’, in 
Zaiotti (ed.), Externalizing Migration Management (Routledge 2016) ch 1. 
3 M Gibney, ‘A Thousand Little Guantánamos: Western States and Measures to 
Prevent the Arrival of Refugees’, in K Tunstall (ed), Displacement, Asylum and Migra-
tion: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2004 (OUP 2006) 139. See also P Novak, ‘The Flex-
ible Territoriality of Borders’ (2011) 16 Geopolitics 741.  
4 For a legal elaboration, see V Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe (OUP 
2017) ch 2. 
5 M Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Forcing Flows of Migrants: European Externalization and 
Border-Induced Displacement’, in DJ Andersen, M Klatt, M Sandberg (eds), The Bor-
der Multiple (Ashgate 2012) 35.   
 Border-induced displacement                                                                                             7 
 
the original reasons forcing people into exile, but rather functions as a 
second-order type of (re-)displacement, produced precisely via (the vio-
lence implicated in) border control. This then leads to forms of ‘engi-
neered regionalism’, that is, politics re-producing displacement in cer-
tain areas closest to the origin of flows.6 ‘Safe third country’ rules and 
practices are the main vehicle of this development, discernible also 
within the EU, where the Dublin System has ‘rulified’ an asymmetric 
allocation of responsibility for asylum claims to peripheral countries sit-
uated at the external common frontiers of the Union, like Spain, Italy 
and Greece.7 In the case of externalization, border-induced displace-
ment is then imposed upon already-displaced persons by non-European 
actors implementing the EU’s pre-emptive control agenda, reinforcing 
prevailing patterns of exploitation and existing hierarchies of exclusion 
and subordination.  
The ethical and legal consequences of ‘distance-creation’ are what 
we turn to analyse in the remainder of this article. Section 2 pays atten-
tion to the assumptions and ethical and political-economic dimensions 
behind this strategy, discussing exit control, coercion, and the demo-
cratic legitimization of unelected actors enforcing the EU border within 
third countries. Section 3 investigates the legal impact of externalization 
and extraterritorialization, centring on the apparent accountability gaps 
that it generates, contesting the legality of responsibility dispersion 
mechanisms. The overall conclusion we reach is that the ‘rulification’ of 
externalization at EU level does not render it ethically and legally tena-
ble under international law. The ‘lawification’ at EU level of practices 
inconsistent with human rights is insufficient to render them compatible 
with international legal standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 M Gibney, ‘Forced Migration, Engineered Regionalism, and Justice between 
States’, in S Kneebone and F Rawlings-Sanaei (eds), New Regionalism and Asylum Seek-
ers (Berghahn Books, 2007) 59. 
7 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 ‘Dublin III’. 
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2.  Ethical distance-creation: Examining attempts to justify externaliza-
tion and border-induced displacement 
 
Although immigration ethics has thrived as a discipline since its late 
arrival in the 1980s, debates on border control between cosmopolitan-
ism and liberal nationalism have often remained at an ideational level 
and generally based on liberal democratic foundations,8 thus overlook-
ing the composite ways through which border control is realized and 
experienced on the ground. This includes practices of externalization 
and extra-territorialization. Often, the assumptions guiding ethical de-
bates on border control have reproduced a territorially trapped gaze, 
circumscribed by methodological nationalism,9 which, through a set of 
idealized premises, reduces the complex and transnational dynamics of 
displacement and border control to a phenomenon of mis-placement 
between territorially bordered societies.10 Such reduction is marred by 
what can be called reactive and regionalist postulations. These view 
border control, first, as a manifestation of State agency, and, second, as 
only a response to migration flows. Third, they naturalize the contain-
ment of displacement within certain regions, perceiving the phenome-
non as geographically and morally distant from Europe.  
But immigration ethics is far from alone in reproducing methodo-
logical nationalism and reactive and regionalist conjectures, as these 
mirror prevailing paradigms about the relationship between displace-
 
8 J Carens, ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’ (1987) 49 The Review 
of Politics 251; B Barry and RE Goodin (eds) Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the 
Transnational Migration of People and Money (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992); M Blake, 
‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy’ (2002) 30 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 257; M Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum. Liberal Democracy and the 
Response to Refugees (CUP 2005). 
9 J Agnew, ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International 
Relations Theory’ (1994) 1 Rev Intl Political Economy 51; A Wimmer, N Glik Schiller, 
‘Methodological Nationalism and Beyond’ (2002) 2 Global Networks 301. 
10 The dominant grounding of ethical debates about border control on a fusion of 
liberal democratic values and methodological nationalism also means that critical 
engagement has been neglected concerning the politically popular perspectives, which 
refuse universal, liberal norms, and question or reject rights-regimes and the associated 
state obligations. This is beyond the scope of the current analysis, see though M 
Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘The “Imaginary World” of Nationalistic Ethics: Feasibility 
constraints on Nordic deportation corridors targeting unaccompanied Afghan minors’ 
(2018) 12 Nordic J of Applied Ethics 47. 
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ment and borders.11 However, it is instructive, nonetheless, to examine 
European externalization by applying existing ethical debates about the 
democratic legitimacy, coercion, and rights of border control to the is-
sue of externalization.12 
 
2.1.  The democratic legitimacy question  
 
One fundamental debate has concerned the democratic legitimacy 
of border control as such. Assuming that freedom and democracy are 
instrumentally valuable for securing individual autonomy, a principled 
concern is that the coercive aspects of border control amount to viola-
tions of autonomy when they happen without the consent of those ex-
posed to them. In order for border control to be legitimate from a lib-
eral democratic perspective, it would have to be justifiable to non-
members – however the demos may initially be defined – through a de-
liberative process.13 Yet, proponents of border control might argue that 
access to asylum procedures can resolve this concern, if asylum applica-
tions are seen as granting such deliberative voice to them. Although this 
debate has only concerned an undifferentiated notion of border control, 
we can extend it to the politics of externalization, if we imagine propo-
nents to argue that, if externalized control is able to respect individual 
autonomy, it might also be deemed democratically legitimate.14 The 
strength of such an argument will then depend on the meaning and 
function of externalization. 
European externalization processes occur when European Member 
States, through bi-, multi- or supranational venues, complement policies 
of controlling cross-border migration into their territories with pre-
 
11 Generally on the different epistemological approaches to the relationship be-
tween migration and borders and their contradictions, see P Novak, ‘Back to Borders’ 
(2017) 43 Critical Sociology 847. 
12 Cf A Abizadeh ‘Democratic Theory and Border Coercion’ (2008) 36 Political 
Theory 37; D Miller, ‘Why Immigration Controls Are Not Coercive’ (2010) 38 Political 
Theory 111. 
13 See also P Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and 
Immigration (Edinburgh UP 2000). 
14 This argument faces further myriad problems that we will not be able to address 
for reasons of space. These concern how to determine the proportional and legitimate 
levels of coercion that the access to asylum would allow, whether asylum procedures are 
deliberative in the manner required to fulfill the conditions of autonomy, etc. 
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emptive initiatives realizing such control extra-territorially and/or 
through sub-contracting to actors and agencies other than their own.15 
Externalization has been discussed in terms of policy transfer, issue-
linkages, and ripple effects,16 but, crucially, its dynamics apply also to 
intra-European relations. For many years, the Dublin system has served 
to transfer the border control burdens of North-Western Member 
States to South-Eastern ones, causing heated discussions about lacking 
solidarity,17 similar to those between European and non-European 
countries.18  
Justifications offered for externalization oscillate between grammars 
of securitized control and humanitarian care.19 For instance, the June 
2018 proposal by the EU ministers about ‘controlled centres’ and ‘re-
gional disembarkation platforms’, whereto ‘boat migrants’ can be de-
ported, is framed as an innovative idea allowing Member States both to 
‘stem illegal migration’ and simultaneously save vulnerable migrants by 
 
15 M Lemberg-Pedersen (n 5); V Moreno-Lax (n 4) chs 4, 5 and 6; T Balzacq, ‘The 
Frontiers of Governance: Understanding the External Dimension of EU Justice and 
Home Affairs’, in T Balzacq (ed), The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Af-
fairs (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 1.  
16 M Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Effective Protection or Effective Combat? EU Border 
Control and North Africa’, in P Gaibazzi, S Dünnwald and A Bellagamba (eds), EurAf-
rican Borders and Migration Management (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 36; S Lavenex and 
EM Uçarer, ‘The External Dimension of Europeanization: The Case of Immigration 
Policies’ (2004) 39 Cooperation and Conflict 417. 
17 For a recent critique, see E Küçük, ‘The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in 
Sharing Responsibility: More than Window Dressing?’ (2016) 22 ELJ 448. 
18 Cf D Mara and C Nathler, ‘Tunisian Migrant Issue Dominates EU Interior Min-
ister Talks’, Deutsche Welle (11 April 2011) <www.dw.com/en/tunisian-migrant-issue-
dominates-eu-interior-minister-talks/a-14981095>. For a legal perspective, see V More-
no-Lax, ‘Solidarity’s Reach: Meaning, Dimensions and Implications for EU (External) 
Asylum Policy’ (2017) 24 Maastricht J Eur and Comparative L 740. 
19 Cf J Carling, M Hernández-Carretero, ‘Protecting Europe and Protecting Mi-
grants? Strategies for Managing Unauthorised Migration from Africa’ (2011) 13 The 
British J of Politics and Intl Relations 43; P Pallister-Wilkins, ‘The Humanitarian Poli-
tics of European Border Policing’ (2015) 9 Intl Political Sociology 53; P Cuttitta, ‘Delo-
calization, Humanitarianism, and Human Rights: The Mediterranean Border Between 
Exclusion and Inclusion’ (2018) 50 Antipode 783; and V Moreno-Lax, ‘The EU Hu-
manitarian Border and the Securitization of Human Rights: The “Rescue-through-
Interdiction/Rescue-without-Protection” Paradigm’ (2018) 56 J Common Market Stud-
ies 119. 
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breaking the ‘business model’ of smugglers and traffickers purportedly 
in accordance with human rights and the rule of law.20 
Yet, the 2018 externalization proposal is not as innovative as it may 
seem. Between the 1980s and mid-2000s, five very similar – and similar-
ly controversial – externalization proposals were put forth by the Brit-
ish, Danish, Dutch, and German governments and by the European 
Commission. And they all revolved around externalized centres in East-
ern Europe and North Africa whereto EU Member States would send 
asylum seekers or interdicted ‘boat migrants’. The terminologies varied 
from ‘regional protection areas’ by the British, ‘processing centres’ by 
the Danes, ‘reception centres’ by the Dutch, ‘EU reception centres’ by 
the German, and ‘Regional Protection Programmes’ (RPPs) by the Eu-
ropean Commission.21 All but the RPP proposal focused on administra-
tive deportation from European territory, so that, as put by the Blair 
government, ‘refoulement should be possible and the notion of an asy-
lum seeker in[land] should die’.22 By 2005, the German proposal had 
dropped any talk of extraterritorial asylum processing and moved on to 
identifying Libya as a promising collaborator for pre-emptive contain-
ment.23 In light of the concurrent dysfunctional intra-European dynam-
ics of the Dublin system, the proposals between 1986 and 2018 illus-
trate how the externalization logic has long been invoked as a magic 
remedy to the Dublin ills, always couched in crisis-laden and emergen-
cy-driven rhetoric, while also holding out vague promises of protection. 
Externalization can be criticized for co-opting protection in favour 
of methods of ‘consensual containment’ that re-produce displacement 
 
20 European Council Conclusions, 28 June 2018, Press Release 421/18. See also Eu-
ropean Commission, Migration: Regional Disembarkation Arrangements (24 July 2018) 
<ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/20180724_factsheet-regional-disembarkation-arrangements_en.pdf>.  
21 For analysis, see M Lemberg-Pedersen (n 10); G Noll, ‘Visions of the Exception-
al: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection 
Zones‘ (2003) 5 European Journal of Migration and Law 303; V Moreno-Lax, ‘External 
Dimension’, in S Peers, V Moreno-Lax, M Garlick and E Guild (eds), EU Immigration 
and Asylum Law (Brill, 2nd edn, 2015) vol 3 ch 10. 
22 UK Government New Vision for Refugees (White Paper, 2003) 9. 
23 Bundesministers des Innern Effektiver Schutz fu ̈r Flüchtlinge, wirkungsvölle Be-
kämpfung illegaler Migration – überlegungen des Bundesministers des Innern zur Errich-
tung einer EU-Aufnahmeeinrichtung in Nordafrika (Pressemitteilung 2005) 3-6. 
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in regions neighbouring the EU.24 For instance, especially since 2017, 
Italy and the EU have pursued a policy of transferring search and res-
cue to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard (LYCG), thereby effectively 
turning missions into operations of exit control. It is due to their mate-
rial contribution and close involvement in the internal command-and-
control structure of the Libyan forces that the LYCG performed 19,452 
pull-backs in 2017.25 Political discourses on externalization can, howev-
er, be seen as arguing that this kind of regionalist engineering creates 
‘protection elsewhere’ based on three claims, popular in ethical discus-
sions on border control within liberal national regimes. In the follow-
ing, we analyse them through standing ethical debates about coercion 
and prevention, peoples’ rights to enter and exit territories, and demo-
cratic legitimacy.  
 
2.2.  Coercion: From ‘protection elsewhere’ to ‘protection nowhere’ 
 
First comes the claim that border control, and thus also its external-
ized manifestations, is not illegitimately coercive, because it is only pre-
ventive. Here, coercion has been referred to as when individuals are 
forced to do a specific thing, while prevention is taken to mean when 
they are forced not to do a specific thing.26 Second comes the aforemen-
tioned argument that border control can be legitimate when agreed up-
on democratically.27 Third follows the statement of an entry/exit-
asymmetry signifying that people’s rights against one State not to pre-
vent them from exiting its territory is held to be morally paramount, but 
 
24 V Moreno-Lax, MG Giuffré, ‘The Raise of Consensual Containment: From 
“Contactless Control” to “Contactless Responsibility” for Forced Migration Flows’, in S 
Juss (ed), Research Handbook on International Refugee Law (Edward Elgar forthcom-
ing) <www.unhcr.org/5a056ca07.pdf>.   
25 IOM, Maritime Update Libyan Coast, 25 October-28 November 2017, 
<www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/IOM-Libya-Maritime-Update-
Libyan-25Oct-28Nov.pdf>. 
26 These definitions of coercion and prevention are offered by D Miller (n 12) 114. 
27 A Abizadeh (n 12) 47. Miller and Abizadeh disagree on the boundaries of the 
demos involved, but this is not crucial to the stated version of the externalization argu-
ment. 
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that it does not entail an equally forceful obligation on any other State 
to let them enter their territory.28  
Combining these claims, we then arrive at a ‘protection elsewhere’ 
argument maintaining that externalization is legitimate, since agreed to 
by all governments involved, and because it preserves displaced per-
sons’ rights through extraterritorial asylum processing. Even if the poli-
cy may block their movement, this argument goes, it only prevents them 
from entering European territory, while still allowing them to find pro-
tection elsewhere, after having exited their own country. The zero-sum 
game effect that the generalisation of this policy would generate goes 
unaverted – if all countries did the same there would be ‘protection 
nowhere’.29 
But this argument is categorically flawed. Its definitions of coercion 
and prevention are problematic and rest upon a disconnect between ab-
stract assumptions about border control guiding liberal nationalistic 
immigration ethics and the actual reality of displacement and European 
border surveillance, discounting its concrete effects on the ground. EU 
externalization practices yield extremely coercive checks amounting to 
violent regimes of exit control, also contravening the legally-sanctioned 
right – assumed in debates on immigration ethics – to leave one’s own 
country.30 That is, even if one, for the sake of argument, assumes the 
right to exit to hold more value than that of entry – since at internation-
al law one is universally applicable while the other is only opposable to 
one’s own country31 – actual externalization practices still violate not 
 
28 D Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (OUP 2007) 207-209. Argu-
ably, the assumption of such asymmetry reflects the norms of Cold War migration geo-
politics, epitomized by the condemnation of the Berlin Wall, and emphasizing the ethi-
cal value of allowing individuals persecuted by totalitarian regimes to exit territories. 
But today, the border control systems of European countries, purportedly liberal demo-
cratic, also involve practices of walling, fencing, and exit control. Moreover, a princi-
pled ethical critique of the entry/exit-asymmetry has also been that the very reasons why 
emigration might be crucial for securing individuals’ fundamental rights, and thus au-
tonomy, may also apply equally strongly to the reasons why people try to immigrate. Cf 
N Holtug, ‘The Ethics of Immigration Policy’ (2011) 1 Nordic J Migration Research 4. 
29 For a legal elaboration see V Moreno-Lax, ‘The Legality of the “Safe Third 
Country” Notion Contested: Insights from the Law of Treaties’, in Goodwin-Gill and 
Weckel (eds), Migration & Refugee Protection in the 21st Century (Nijhoff 2015) 665. 
30 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, François 
Crépeau, UN Doc A/HRC/29/36 (2015). 
31 For a full-length analysis of the right to leave, see V Moreno-Lax (n 4) ch 9. 
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just the latter, but also the former.32 The containment of migrants in 
Libyan detention structures, for instance, reveals an abusive regime that 
bars access to asylum. Amnesty International has counted twenty re-
ports from reliable monitors, including UN and EU sources, attesting to 
this reality.33 The abject brutality facing displaced persons, contained 
and circulated through externalization, can only be labelled non-
coercive prevention from a Eurocentric, and extremely abstract vantage 
point. In truth, they cause suffering on such a scale that they may 
amount to atrocity crimes, according to the ICC Prosecutor,34 and, as 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has put it, they consti-
tute ‘an outrage to the conscience of humanity’ – at least as far as the 
situation in Libya is concerned.35 Collaborative border infrastructures 
are endowed with the power to coerce at a distance, with externaliza-
tion leading to practices of ‘remote control’ that extraterritorially negate 
access to the European asylum systems to those (theoretically) entitled 
to international protection,36 literally ‘trapping’ migrants in a constant 
‘cycle of abuse’.37  
Nevertheless, even if the ethical ‘protection elsewhere’ argument 
must be rejected as an invalid justification for current European exter-
nalization policies the reasons for it are instructive. Seeing how exter-
nalization produces highly coercive collaborative regimes of exit control 
makes clear the problematic ramifications of the reactive and regionalist 
assumptions on which it rests. Conventional views on international rela-
tions and forced migration see the displacement to which borders re-
 
32 ibid. Cf. N Markard, ‘The Right to Leave by Sea: Legal Limits on EU Migration 
Control by Third Countries’ (2106) 27 Eur J Intl L 591. 
33 Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion (December 2017) 56-58 
<www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/7561/2017/en>. See also Human Rights 
Watch, No Escape from Hell (January 2019) <www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/21/no-
escape-hell/eu-policies-contribute-abuse-migrants-libya>.  
34 ICC Prosecutor, Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situa-
tion in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011) 8 November 2017 <www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp_lib_unsc>. 
35 ‘UN Human Rights Chief: Suffering of Migrants in Libya Outrage to Conscience 
of Humanity’ Press Release (14 November 2017) <www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/ 
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22393&LangID=E>.  
36 L Bialasiewicz, ‘Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing the Borders of Europe: Libya and 
EU Border Work in the Mediterranean’ (2012) 17 Geopolitics 843. 
37 Amnesty International, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea (August 2018) 
18 <www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR3089062018ENGLISH.pdf>. 
 Border-induced displacement                                                                                             15 
 
spond as induced by conflicts or developmental or environmental fac-
tors.38 Yet, while attention to the causes of displacement is important, 
this model embraces borders as only reactive to – rather than also consti-
tutive of – displacement. But this is wrong. A range of border practices 
and infrastructures, performed at or beyond the physical frontiers of the 
EU, such as interdiction, detention, and deportation, do not just react 
to, but also in themselves cause displacement, by diverting flows to-
wards increasingly dangerous routes and by multiplying death ratios at 
sea and at border zones.39 This ‘border-induced displacement’, there-
fore, challenges the regionalist and reactive premise that the production 
of forced migration is primarily a problem created outside European 
territory and agency and contests the structural incorporation of (fore-
seeably lethal) coercion as a legitimate mechanism of border control. 
EU-Libyan relations, since the 2000s, illustrate how externalization 
has built the infrastructures enabling this kind of coercive re-
displacement. This problematizes prevailing assumptions still dominat-
ing immigration ethics and politics, namely that the agency of border 
control consists of States’ discretion over movement across their territo-
rial borders. Externalization underscores the need to consider more 
composite notions of agency – and thus responsibility – decoupled from 
national territories, and spanning several governments, organisations as 
well as non-state actors.  
The decades-long European-Libyan collaboration on border control 
is a case in point. After the European Commission decided to lift its 
arms embargo against Libya in 2004, two ‘technical missions’ followed. 
The first, in 2004, was meant to ‘identify concrete measures for possible 
balanced EU-Libyan cooperation particularly on illegal immigration’ 
and the second, in 2007, to develop ‘an operational and technical part-
nership’ for extraterritorial border control.40 The case of Libya is but 
one example of how European externalization policies have facilitated 
 
38 A Betts, Forced migration and global politics (Wiley-Blackwell 2009) 4-10. 
39 M Lemberg-Pedersen (n 16) 54-6; V Moreno-Lax (n 4) chs 3 to 6. Among others, 
The Human Cost of Border Control project provides primary source information and 
statistical evidence of these correlations <www.borderdeaths.org/>. 
40 Cf Technical Mission to Libya on Illegal Migration, 27 November–6 December 
2004, Council Doc 7753/05 <www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/eu-report-libya-ill-
imm.pdf>; Frontex-led EU Illegal Immigration Technical Mission to Libya, 28 May–5 
June 2007 <www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu-libya-frontex-report.pdf>. 
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the transformation of European border control into a flourishing mar-
ket of violent deterrence and containment,41 with little to do with a 
rights-based protection paradigm, and also how third countries’ control 
apparatuses have become a lucrative export venture for the arms-, secu-
rity-, and IT-industries of the EU Member States.42  
 
2.3. Trading in rights for border control 
 
Companies like Spanish Indra, British BAE Systems, Italian Leo-
nardo, French Thales and Ocea, Dutch Damen, German Rheinmetall 
and Airbus all compete for contracts to expand the capacity for surveil-
lance and control of not just Libya, but also other Eastern European, 
North African and Middle Eastern countries collaborating on EU ex-
ternalization. In 2012, an industrial consulting actor valued the global 
border industry at €25.8 billion, projecting an increase to €56 billion by 
2022.43 And European sales of patrol boats, jeeps, planes, drones, satel-
lites, helicopters, radar systems and whole surveillance mechanisms for 
border control purposes were part of the EU export licenses worth €82 
billion to the Middle East and North Africa between 2005–2014.44 This 
political economy of externalization also applies to the industries of EU 
partner countries. For instance, in 2016, the EU channelled more than 
€83 million to contracts with Turkish Aselsan and Otokar to provide 
heavily armoured vehicles placed, respectively, at the Greek-Turkish 
 
41 M Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Private Security Companies and the European Bor-
derscapes’, in N Nyberg Sørensen and T Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds), The Migration In-
dustry and the Commercialization of International Migration (Routledge 2013) 152; R 
Andersson, Illegality Inc. Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe (U 
California Press 2014); T Baird, ‘Interest Groups and Strategic Constructivism: Busi-
ness Actors and Border Security in the European Union’ (2017) 44 J Ethnic and Migra-
tion Studies 118. 
42 M Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Security, Industry and Migration in European Border 
Control’, in A Weinar, S Bonjour and L Zhyznomirska (eds), The Routledge Handbook 
of the Politics of Migration in Europe (Routledge 2018) 239.  
43 Frost & Sullivan, Global Border and Maritime Security Market Assessment Hu-
man-Intensive Security on the Border and Maritime Domain Will Increase the Demand for 
New Technology (February 2014) 965 ff <www.frost.com/sublib/display-report.do? 
id=M965-01-00-00-00>.  
44 Seventeenth annual report according to Art 8(2) of Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military tech-
nology and equipment [2016] OJ C 163/1. 
 Border-induced displacement                                                                                             17 
 
border and the newly constructed 911 kilometre border-wall between 
Turkey and Syria.45  
The dynamics reshaping third-country border infrastructures eluci-
date how borders can function as engines of, rather than just responses 
to, displacement. This means that arguments for externalization appeal-
ing to democratic legitimacy face more problems than merely the bar-
ring of access to asylum procedures: First, because when EU Member 
States use their political-economic leverage to make externalization 
deals with non-EU countries, they are effectively asking them to replace 
their own public interest with the EU preference of avoiding asylum 
seeker flows towards the Member States. Second, because several ex-
amples, like the EU collaboration with Libyan actors, including militias 
and former traffickers, as further discussed in the next section, illustrate 
how the EU’s externalization partners very often lack democratic legit-
imacy.46 EU border externalization entrenches forms of undemocratic 
governance in third countries, empowering undemocratic actors, trans-
forming their relative weight within domestic structures, and weakening 
democratic channels of scrutiny, accountability, and power control. Ex-
ternalization thereby risks creating a vicious cycle, where the influx of 
arms and funds to those actors willing to enact the European contain-
ment agenda grants them political validity, which is then used to un-
dermine not only migrant rights, but also to repress domestic opposi-
tion and dissidence and thus destabilize internal democratisation pro-
cesses. The short-term European goal of preventing asylum seeker flows 
thereby risks compromising the stated long-term goal of tackling the 
root causes of displacement,47 which is sacrificed in the altar of external-
ised ‘integrated border management’.48  
 
 
45 Z Şentek, S Arsu, ‘No Way Out: The European Union is Funding Military 
Equipment used by Turkey to Stop Refugees from Fleeing the Syrian Civil War and En-
tering the EU’ The Black Sea (23 March 2018) <theblacksea.eu/billions-for-
borders/article/en/no-way-out#>.  
46 Eg ‘Libyan Militia Cash in on EU’s Anti-Smuggling Strategy’ EU Observer (5 
October 2018) <euobserver.com/migration/143003>.   
47 M Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Externalizing Brutality to Libya Is Not an Answer to 
Displacement’, ECRE Op-Ed (1 December 2017) <www.ecre.org/op-ed-externalizing-
brutality-to-libya-is-not-an-answer-to-displacement>.  
48 Art 77(1)(c) TFEU.  
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3.  Legal distance-creation: The juridical implications of externalization 
and border-induced displacement 
 
Externalization has not only been encapsulated in political and poli-
cy arguments and practices, but has also been embedded in law through 
the ‘protection elsewhere’ model. The ‘protection elsewhere’ model ul-
timately rests on the assumption that refugees and migrants are best 
served ‘at home’, whether it be in their countries of origin or in the 
neighbouring region (but away from the EU at any rate). ‘Onward 
movements’ defy this logic and are thus seriously penalized. Responsi-
bility for reception and asylum has accordingly been delegated (or redi-
rected) to countries proximate to the source of flows, via targeted rules 
on ‘safe third countries’ and readmission agreements that legalise the 
practice. But, as stated above, this (re-)allocation of protection duties to 
peripheral States is also part and parcel of the Common European Asy-
lum System within the EU. The Dublin Regulation enshrines and ‘ruli-
fies’ this vision for the Member States, allowing non-external border 
countries to deflect responsibility in a legal manner.  
Against this background, EU countries feel legitimized to claim 
their own irresponsibility vis-à-vis non-Member States,49 projecting the 
model onto their external relations and imposing compliance with EU 
control rules as a matter of course. Fatalities at sea and elsewhere are 
then presented as the result of disorder and illegality; something avoid-
able if only (EU) rules were observed and effectively enforced by non-
EU partners. The structural conditions imposed by the externalization 
apparatus, and the injustice that ensues, are usually disregarded or 
downplayed as unintended collateral damage. The fact that illegality is 
the only way out of a situation of want or persecution, and that smug-
gling is the only remaining vehicle to reach safety, is routinely silenced. 
It is the smugglers who profit of the precarious situation of ‘boat mi-
grants’ – the argument goes. So, the eradication of smuggling and a re-
turn to (EU) law and order is portrayed as the solution. The option to 
relax border control rules and adapt them to the imperatives of human 
 
49 Cf S Fine, T Lindemann, ‘European Democracies and the Responsibility to Not 
Protect’, Open Democracy, 20 September 2018 <www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-
make-it/shoshana-fine-thomas-lindemann/european-democracies-and-responsibility-to-
not-pro>.  
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dignity, decriminalising the irregular movement of forced migrants, is 
not even contemplated. That would be perceived as an illogical conces-
sion; a descent into chaos and the negation of the rule of (EU) law. This 
EU-centric conception of the law is what sustains the externalization 
edifice and nurtures the collaboration with third countries.   
At the legal-strategic level, externalization politics are accompanied 
by at least two degrees of ‘irresponsibilitization’, enshrined in, and sanc-
tioned by, EU law: responsibility diffusion and responsibility denial. 
‘Diffusion’ refers to the relational dimension of externalization, to situa-
tions of multi-actor alliance where the causation chain and attribution 
operation become unclear, with different agents and organs of different 
States contributing to a particular (unlawful) result. By contrast, ‘denial’ 
captures scenarios of outright disclaiming of responsibility, where this is 
said to belong to a different actor altogether, according to the (usually 
EU-based) rules in place (or their self-serving interpretation).  
 
 3.1. Responsibility diffusion 
 
The creation of physical distance, via exit control, disembarkation 
platforms, holding sites, or reception camps abroad, contributes to ‘ir-
responsibilitization’ through diffusion. None of the proposals put forth 
so far clarifies exactly who should be considered responsible for those 
intercepted in, and repatriated to, Libya or any alternative location 
hosting the centres. The overall supposition appears to be that EU 
Member States would ultimately escape the task.50 But there is some re-
sidual notion that European countries could not completely ‘circum-
vent’ their obligations51 – albeit without elaboration, even the Legal 
Service of the European Parliament concedes that migrants sent to dis-
embarkation platforms located outside the territory of the Member 
States ‘should benefit from the guarantees provided for in the 1951 Ge-
 
50 For a similar analysis, see F Maiani, ‘“Regional Disembarkation Platforms” and 
“Controlled Centres”: Lifting the Drawbridge, Reaching out Across the Mediterranean, 
or Going Nowhere?’ EU Migration Law Blog (18 September 2018) <eumigrationlaw-
blog.eu/regional-disembarkation-platforms-and-controlled-centres-lifting-the-drawbridge-
reaching-out-across-the-mediterranean-or-going-nowhere>. 
51 ‘Theo Francken Accuses EU of Hypocrisy’, The Brussels Times, 7 June 2018 
<www.brusselstimes.com/eu-affairs/11558/theo-francken-accuses-eu-of-hypocrisy>. 
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neva Convention […] and in the European Convention of Human 
Rights’, including the principle of non-refoulement.52 
Actually, under international law, ‘no State can avoid responsibility 
by outsourcing or contracting out its obligations’.53 Cooperation with 
third countries does not exonerate EU Member States from their non-
refoulement and related duties – both under general customary law and 
as per the relevant international Conventions.54 According to the Stras-
bourg Court, ‘[w]here States establish [...] international agreements to 
pursue cooperation in certain fields of activity’, whatever their legal na-
ture, validity, and intent,55 ‘there may be implications for the protection 
of fundamental rights’. With this in mind, it would be ‘incompatible 
with the purpose and object of the [European Convention of Human 
Rights]56 if Contracting States were thereby absolved from their respon-
sibility under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered 
by such [agreements]’.57 As a result, ‘[i]n so far as any liability under the 
Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the Con-
tracting State [...]’.58 Despite its cooperation with Libya or any other 
third country, the independent responsibility of each EU Member State 
 
52 Opinion of the Legal Service of the European Parliament, Re: LIBE – European 
Union asylum and immigration policies – Regional disembarkation platforms and con-
trolled centres – European Council Conclusions of 28th of June 2018 (on file with the 
authors) paras 44, 45, 53 and 58. 
53 G Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Extraterritorial Processing of Claims to Asylum or Protec-
tion: The Legal Responsibilities of States and International Organisations’ (2007) 9 UTS 
L Rev 26, 34. See also M Den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (Hart 2012) ch 
7. 
54 See further V Moreno-Lax, ‘Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a 
Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea’ (2011) 23 Intl 
J Refugee L 174. See also V Moreno-Lax (n 4) ch 8 on the extraterritorial application of 
non-refoulement and its legal nature in international law.  
55 These agreements may indeed be null and void ipso jure if they conflict with jus 
cogens norms, pursuant to Art 53 VCLT, which some authors claim is precisely the rank 
of the prohibition of refoulement. See eg J Allain, ‘The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-
refoulement’ (2001) 13 International Journal of Refugee Law 533. Cf C Costello and M 
Foster, ‘Non-refoulement as Custom and Jus Cogens? Putting the Prohibition to the 
Test’  (2015) 46 Netherlands YB Intl L 273. 
56 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights) (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into 
force 3 September 1953) ETS 5 (ECHR). 
57 T.I. v United Kingdom App no 43844/98 (ECtHR, 7 March 2000) 15; K.R.S. v. 
United Kingdom App no 32733/08 (ECtHR, 2 December 2008) 15.  
58 Saadi v United Kingdom App no 37201/06 (ECtHR, 28 February 2008) para 126. 
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participating in the scheme of externalized migration controls subsists, 
‘where the person[s] in question [...] risk suffering a flagrant denial of 
the guarantees and rights secured to [them] under the Convention’.59  
Nor would Member States be able to evade responsibility by trans-
ferring functions to the UNHCR or the IOM – whatever their support 
and potential separate liability.60 ‘Absolving Contracting States com-
pletely from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered by 
such a transfer would [again] be incompatible with the purpose and ob-
ject of the Convention’, as Strasbourg clarifies. The final effect would 
be for ‘the guarantees of the Convention [to] be limited or excluded at 
will thereby depriving it of its peremptory character and undermining 
the practical and effective nature of its safeguards’,61 negating the basic 
premise of the pacta sunt servanda principle.62 And the same is true in 
regard to other instruments of international human rights law. 
Even though several actors combine to produce re-displacement, 
individual responsibility for its effects cannot be deflected. The princi-
ple is well established in international law. Article 47 of the ILC Articles 
on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) 
contemplates precisely the scenario where several States participate in 
the same internationally wrongful act, stipulating that in such cases ‘the 
responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act’.63 
Each State retains responsibility and, according to the ILC Commen-
tary, ‘is separately responsible for the conduct attributable to it’. The 
fact that one or more additional States also contribute to the same act in 
no way reduces the responsibility of each single country.64 So, any or-
ders or transfers performed, or orchestrated by, EU Member States will 
 
59 W.M. v Denmark App no 17392/90 (EComHR, 14 October 1992). 
60 ‘IOM, UNHCR Appeal for Region-Wide Action by EU Countries over Mediter-
ranean Tragedies’ UNHCR Press Release (27 June 2018) <www.unhcr.org/news/press/ 
2018/6/5b33d8bf4/iom-unhcr-appeal-region-wide-action-eu-Countries-mediterranean-
tragedies.html>. 
61 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland App no 
45036/98 (ECtHR, 30 June 2005) para 154. 
62 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 art 26 (heading). 
63 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Annex 
UNGA Res 56/83 (2001), A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4 (ARSIWA) (emphasis added). 
64 ILC Commentary on Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, fifty-third Sess, A/56/10 (2001) 124 (ARSIWA Commentary) (emphasis 
added). See also J Crawford, State Responsibility (CUP 2013) 355.  
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engage their responsibility for any resulting breaches of their interna-
tional commitments.  
Neither the ‘disembarkation platforms’ proposal, nor any other of 
the similar initiatives emerged since the 1980s explored above specifies 
where exactly those repatriated or ‘pulled back’, whether to Libya or 
other third countries, would be accommodated.65 It is conceivable that 
proponents envisage offshore reception centres to be closed, since the 
ultimate aim is to contain and deter irregular movement.66 This then en-
tails large-scale, and potentially long-term, detention, in breach of Arti-
cle 5 ECHR guarantees,67 which have been recognised to apply extra-
territorially, extending to cases of deprivation of liberty abroad.68 Yet, 
the border-induced displacement effects of externalization practices, 
like involuntary retention in international waters, forcible transfer to 
warships, coercive escorting or imposing of a certain course, constitute 
restrictions of physical freedom and need to accommodate the legal 
safeguards of the Convention.69 
It is not known whether the ‘disembarkation platforms’ proposal 
foresees transfers to the country concerned to be automatic. Should that 
be the case, EU Member States risk incurring direct and indirect viola-
tions of the prohibition of collective expulsion and the (non-
derogable/non-limitable) protection against refoulement. Regarding the 
latter, the Strasbourg Court attaches paramount importance to country 
 
65 Note that so far no African country has agreed to the strategy. See ‘EU Admits 
No African Country Has Agreed to Host Migration Centre’ The Guardian (21 June 
2018) <www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/21/eu-admits-no-african-Country-has-
agreed-to-host-migration-centre>.    
66 Some EU leaders have advocated for ‘floating centres’. See A Dastyari, D 
Ghezelbash, ‘Opinion: European Plans for Refugee “Floating Reception Centres” Will 
Endanger Lives’ ABC News (20 September 2018) <www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-
20/europe-asylum-seekers-australia-mediterranean-austria-italy/10265238>.   
67 Cf Saadi v United Kingdom (n 58). For a critique, see V Moreno-Lax, ‘Beyond 
Saadi v. UK: Why the “Unnecessary” Detention of Asylum Seekers is Inadmissible un-
der EU Law’ (2011) 5 Human Rights & Intl L Discourse 166. 
68 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v United Kingdom App no 61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 
2010). See also Al-Skeini v United Kingdom App no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011); 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012). See fur-
ther, V Moreno-Lax, ‘Hirsi v Italy or the Strasbourg Court v Extraterritorial Migration 
Control?’ (2012) 12 Human Rights L Rev 574. 
69 Rigopoulous v Spain App no 37388/97 (ECtHR, 12 January 1999); Medvedyev v 
France App no 3394/03 (ECtHR, 10 July 2008). 
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information contained in reports from independent sources,70 so that 
when reliable accounts of the circumstances prevailing in the receiving 
State make it ‘sufficiently real and probable’ that the general situation 
entails a ‘real risk’ of ill treatment in the sense of Article 3 ECHR, a re-
foulement presumption is activated and removal cannot be performed.71 
What is more, on account of the absolute character of Article 3, Con-
tracting Parties must undertake the relevant investigation proprio motu 
and abstain from actions/omissions that put individuals at risk. As the 
Court asserted in Hirsi, ‘it [is] for the national authorities, faced with a 
situation in which human rights [are] systematically violated [...] to find 
out about the treatment to which the applicants would be exposed after 
their return’.72 So, the Member States concerned are to comply with 
their non-refoulement obligations proactively, regardless of whether the 
persons in question seek protection or specifically alert of the dangers 
faced upon return. The fact that potential applicants fail to request asy-
lum or to formally oppose their removal does not absolve Contracting 
Parties of their Convention duties,73 and especially their positive due 
diligence obligations.  
This includes the requirement to provide access to adequate proce-
dures.74 Member States must offer a real opportunity for individuals to 
submit and defend their claims,75 including an ‘effective remedy’.76 This 
requires that the remedy in question be able to ‘prevent the execution 
of measures that are contrary to the Convention and whose effects are 
potentially irreversible’. Therefore, ‘it is inconsistent with Article 13 
[ECHR] for such measures to be executed before the national authori-
ties [of the Member State concerned] have examined whether they are 
 
70 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (n 68) paras 118 and 123. 
71 ibid para 136. 
72 ibid para 133. 
73 ibid paras 133 and 157. See also G Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Right to Seek Asylum: In-
terception at Sea and the Principle of Non-Refoulement’ (2011) 23 International J Refu-
gee L 443.  
74 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (n 68) paras 203-204. 
75 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011) paras 
301 and 319. See further, E Guild, C Costello, M Garlick, V Moreno-Lax, M Mouzou-
rakis and S Carrera, New Approaches, Alternative Avenues and Means of Access to Asy-
lum Procedures for Persons Seeking International Protection, PE509.989 (European Par-
liament 2014) ch 4 <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509989/ 
IPOL_STU(2014)509989_EN.pdf>. 
76 Jabari v Turkey App no 40035/98 (ECtHR, 11 July 2000) para 48. 
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compatible with the Convention’.77 In these cases, appeals must have 
‘automatic suspensive effect’.78 And screening on board interdicting 
vessels or somewhere else offshore cannot satisfy these requirements.79 
Procedural responsibilities, just like substantive guarantees, cannot be 
deflected, postponed, or negated. The ultimate guarantors of ECHR 
safeguards are the Contracting Parties, which must ‘secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Con-
vention’.80  
Due diligence commands the dual duty to refrain from any conduct 
that may result in arbitrary violations as well as the obligation to enact 
laws and policies that effectively protect individuals against abuse. Fol-
lowing the Human Rights Committee’s recent General Comment on the 
Right to Life, by analogy, State Parties are required to ‘organise all State 
organs and governance structures through which public authority is ex-
ercised in a manner consistent with the need to respect and ensure 
[human rights]’. This includes a duty of ‘continuous supervision’ in or-
der to ‘prevent, investigate, punish and remedy’ any harm.81 As a result, 
actions such as the ‘sale […] of […] weapons’, and presumably other 
similar law enforcement and border control equipment, must be pre-
ceded by a conscientious examination of its foreseeable impact on hu-
man rights.82 As members of the international community and as sub-
jects of customary law, States must take into account 
 
 
77 Conka v Belgium App no 51564/99 (ECtHR, 5 February 2002) para 79 (emphasis 
added). 
78 Gebremedhin v France App no 25389/05 (ECtHR, 26 April 2007) para 66; I.M. v 
France App no 9152/09 (ECtHR, 2 May 2012) paras 132, 134-135; A.C. v Spain App no 
6528/11 (ECtHR, 22 April 2014) para 95. 
79 Cf ‘Austria, Italy Propose Processing Refugees on Ships’ Deutsche Welle (15 
September 2018) <www.dw.com/en/austria-italy-propose-processing-refugees-on-
ships/a-45496615>.   
80 Art 1 ECHR. For an elaboration and further references, see V Moreno-Lax (n 4) 
chs 8 and 10. 
81 HRC, ‘General Comment No 36’ (2018) on article 6 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on the right to life UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018, paras 7, 18, 19 and 21 (emphasis added). On the 
requirements of investigations, see paras 27-28. The ECHR imposes similar positive ob-
ligations under Arts 2 and 3. See eg Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi (n 68); M.S.S. (n 75); Oth-
man (Abu Qatada) v UK App no 8139/09 (ECtHR, 9 May 2012).  
82 HRC (n 81) para 65. 
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‘their responsibility […] to protect lives and to oppose widespread or 
systematic attacks on [human rights]’83 – like those sustained by mi-
grants in Libya.84 And, in particular, States have an obligation under 
general international law ‘not to aid or assist activities undertaken by 
other States and non-State actors that violate [human rights]’.85  
 
All these reasons should lead to the rejection of ‘disembarkation 
platforms’ and similar initiatives as ‘externalization fantasyland’.86 EU 
Member States should not invest in a formula that promotes coopera-
tion with human rights perpetrators and impedes the fulfilment of their 
pre-contracted obligations – such a course would hardly qualify as a 
good faith implementation of their binding commitments.87 Instead, 
domestic systems of territorial protection should be reinforced, includ-
ing the necessary intra-EU solidarity and responsibility-sharing mecha-
nisms to make them effective.88 Physical distance-creation, through off-
shoring and outsourcing, does not translate into an erasure or diminu-
tion of legal duties. EU rules on ‘safe third countries’ and readmission 
cannot (unilaterally) undo international standards.89 
 
 3.2. Responsibility denial 
 
Besides tools of responsibility deflection, mechanisms of outright 
denial of obligations are equally challenging. Usually, the capacitation 
of third countries’ control infrastructures, mimicking the Schengen ‘in-
tegrated border management’ system,90 is framed as unproblematic. The 
transfer of funds, know-how, and equipment, as in the cases referred to 
in the previous section, are considered to emanate from a spirit of soli-
darity with non-EU partners and to be fully in line with the relevant cri-
 
83 ibid para 70. 
84 Amnesty International (n 33); Human Rights Watch (n 33). 
85 HRC (n 81) para 63. 
86 C Woollard, ‘Editorial: Lost in Externalization Fantasyland’ ECRE Bulletin (22 
June 2018) <perma.cc/NJL5-T4U5>. 
87 Art 26 VCLT: ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith’ (emphasis added). 
88 Art 80 TFEU. On the workings of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, see V Moreno-Lax (n 18).   
89 For a detailed discussion, see V Moreno-Lax (n 29).  
90 Art 77(1)(c) TFEU. 
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teria. The ethical distance between the EU or Member State gifting as-
sets, ceding resources, or providing training and any potential human 
rights violations that may ensue is taken to preclude liability. There is 
no intent – no dolus specialis – intervening in the operation. Thus, the 
denial of responsibility on the European side for the atrocities in Libya, 
the abuses in Turkey, or the fatalities at sea associated with border-
induced displacement, commonly recurs.91   
Yet, international law paints a more complex picture.92 If one con-
siders that it is ‘thanks’93 to Italy, for instance, that the LYCG continues 
to exist in any functional form in the post-Kaddafi period,94 an outright 
denial of responsibility becomes difficult.95  
Especially since the signature of the Memorandum of Understand-
ing between Italy and the Libyan Government of National Accord in 
February 2017,96 the delivery of training, equipment, and assets (includ-
ing the four main patrol vessels employed by the LYCG) has intensi-
fied. Italy has created a dedicated ‘Africa Fund’, € 2.5 million of which 
has been allocated to the maintenance of LYCG boats and the training 
 
91 For a recent example, see the EU’s reaction to the claim by 17 Nigerian migrants 
rescued on 6 November 2017 by Sea Watch filed against Italy for their ‘pull-back’ oper-
ations conducted via the LYCG, ‘Migranti: UE “L’Italia rispetta le leggi”’ ANSA (8 
May 2018) <www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/topnews/2018/05/08/migranti-ue-italia-rispetta-
le-leggi_17faec35-69dc-445e-9ead-491706e595dc.html>. For human rights violations 
occurring at sea since the outbreak of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’, consult the Search and 
Rescue Observatory for the Mediterranean (SAROBMED) <https://sarobmed.org/>. 
92 On the specific matter of intent, see ARSIWA Commentary (n 64) 36: ‘it is only 
the act of a State that matters, independently of any intention’. In this line, see also V 
Lanovoy, ‘Complicity in an Internationally Wrongful Act: An Appraisal of the State of 
the Art’, in A Knollkaemper, I Plakokefalos (eds), Principles of Shared Responsibility in 
International Law (CUP 2014) 134, 152 ff.  
93 Chiragov and Others v Armenia App no 13216/05 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015) para 
178. 
94 Cf Catan and Others v Moldova and Russia App no 43370/04, no 8252/05, no 
18454/06 (ECtHR, 19 October 2012) para 106. 
95 For a detailed review of Italy’s entanglement with the Libyan Coast Guard, see C 
Heller and L Pezzani, ‘Mare Clausum: Italy and the EU’s Undeclared Operation to Stem 
Migration across the Mediterranean’, Forensic Oceanography, May 2018, Forensic Ar-
chitecture <www.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018-05-07-
FO MareClausum-full-EN.pdf>.  
96 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding (2 February 2017) English translation 
<https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM_translatio
n_finalversion.doc.pdf>. 
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of their crews.97 The EU, too, has committed € 46 million to prop up 
Libyan interdiction capacity.98 It has been calculated that the total com-
bined investment by Italy and the EU will be € 285 million by 2023,99 
with the EU alone providing € 282 million – most of which via pro-
grammes administered, coordinated, or supervised by Italy.100 In addi-
tion, an extension of the Mare Sicuro Operation, named NAURAS,101 
was approved by the Italian Parliament in August 2017, consisting of 
four ships, four helicopters, and 600 servicemen, of which 70 per cent 
are deployed at sea, with the other 30 per cent stationed in Tripoli har-
bour. Their key mission, as declared by the Italian Navy itself, is to ‘es-
tablish [the] operational condition[s] for LN/LNCG [i.e. Libyan Navy 
and LYCG] assets and develop C2 [ie command-and-control] capabili-
ties’. Meanwhile, an ‘ITN [ie Italian Navy] naval asset in Tripoli Har-
bour [is] acting as LNCC [ie Libyan Navy Communication Centre] and 
logistic assistance/support hub’, thus assuming the function of a float-
ing maritime rescue coordination centre.102  
The nature of the LYCG as a proxy for Italian interdiction has fur-
thermore been confirmed by the judge of Catania adjudicating on the 
related case concerning the rescue ship Open Arms of the NGO Proac-
tiva. In his decision, the judge takes as proven the crucial role played by 
Italy in leading LYCG operations. The judge goes so far as to affirm 
that the interventions of Libyan patrol vessels happen ‘under the aegis 
of the Italian Navy’ and that the coordination of rescue missions is ‘es-
sentially entrusted to the Italian Navy, with its own naval assets and 
 
97 The practice has been contested and a legal challenge is currently pending in this 
regard. See ‘NGO Takes Italy to Court over Misappropriation of Development Funds 
Directed to Libyan Coastguards’ ECRE News (24 November 2017) 
<www.ecre.org/ngo-takes-italy-to-court-over-misappropriation-of-development-funds-
directed-to-libyan-coastguards>.  
98 European Commission, EU Cooperation on Migration in Libya (8 May 2018) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eutf-noa-ly-08052018.pdf>.  
99 ‘EU and Italy put Aside €285m to Boost Libyan Coast Guard’ EU Observer (29 
November 2017) <https://euobserver.com/migration/140067>. 
100 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Libya (undated) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya>. 
101 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre Rome, Guardia costiera italiana, Annual 
Report 2017 <www.guardiacostiera.gov.it/attivita/Documents/attivita-sar-
immigrazione-2017/Rapporto_annuale_2017_ENG.pdf>.  
102  Italian Navy, Operation Mare Sicuro Presentation, SHADE MED Briefing (23-
24 November 2017) (on file with the authors).  
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with those provided to the Libyans’.103 This corroborates the ‘high de-
gree of integration’ between the two,104 and the ‘effective control’ exer-
cised by Italy over LYCG operations, making ensuing violations at-
tributable to it.105  
The subsequent abuse of those pulled back to Tripoli happens de-
spite Italy’s knowledge of the desperate situation facing migrants in 
Libya, including widespread and systematic torture, rape, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and enslavement. The Deputy Minister for For-
eign Affairs himself admitted that ‘taking [migrants] back to Libya, at 
this moment, means taking them back to hell’.106 Nonetheless, the in-
terdiction by proxy policy of Italy continues.107 Amnesty International 
estimates that there are over 10,000 persons currently held in official 
detention centres in Libya – all of which funded through EU/Italian 
money. And, virtually all of them have been brought there as a result of 
their interdiction at sea by the EU/Italian-equipped and -trained 
LYCG.108 Consequently, the combination of control exercised – though 
‘contactless’109 – and the knowledge of the circumstances migrants face 
should be understood to render Italy answerable for the resulting hu-
man rights violations, even if the LYCG is used as a surrogate.  
As per Article 8 ARSIWA, ‘[t]he conduct of a person or group of 
persons [such as the LYCG] shall be considered an act of a State [i.e. 
Italy in this case]’, when the group in question ‘is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carry-
ing out the conduct’. Taking the Italian Navy and the Judge of Catania’s 
assertions at face value, the LYCG are to be considered ‘auxiliaries’ of 
the Italian border machinery deployed extraterritorially, ‘instructed to 
 
103 Tribunale di Catania, no 3476/18 R.G.N.R. and no 2474/18 R.G.GIP (27 March 
2018) 22 <www.dirittoimmigrazionecittadinanza.it/allegati/fascicolo-n-2-2018/256-trib-
catania-27-3-2018/file>.  
104 Chiragov and Others v Armenia (n 93) paras 176 and 186. 
105 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (n 68) para 138 ff. 
106  ‘Giro: Fare rientrare quelle persone vuol dire condannarle all’inferno’, La 
Stampa (6 August 2017) <www.lastampa.it/2017/08/06/italia/cronache/giro-fare-
rientrare-quelle-persone-vuol-dire-condannarle-allinferno-
SXnGzVlzftFl7fNGFCMADN/pagina.html>. 
107  ‘Nigerian migrants sue Italy for aiding Libyan coast guard’ Reuters (8 May 
2018) <www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-italy/nigerian-migrants-sue-italy-
for-aiding-libyan-coast-guard-idUSKBN1I9206>.  
108 Amnesty International, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea (n 37) 17-18. 
109 V Moreno-Lax and MG Giuffré (n 24).   
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carry out particular [interdiction] missions abroad’. The Italian Navy 
conducts the specific operations through its NAURAS effectives exer-
cising coordination as well as command-and-control functions, meaning 
that the (wrongful) conduct of the LYCG shall be considered ‘an inte-
gral part of the operations’ aimed at impeding departures across the 
Central Mediterranean and thus be attributed to Italy.110 It is the Italian 
authorities that locate targets, relay maritime coordinates, and equip 
and mandate the LYCG to proceed to the interdiction of migrant 
boats.111 It is Italy that ‘directs’ the operations in a way that ‘does not 
encompass mere incitement or suggestion but rather connotes actual di-
rection of an operative kind’.112 Italian intervention is a sine qua non for 
the ‘pull-backs’ at sea to materialise, which could not be carried out au-
tonomously by the LYCG.113 Italy exercises ‘such a degree of control 
[…] as to justify treating the [LYCG] as acting on its behalf’.114  
Italy’s involvement in Libyan search and rescue (or rather, interdic-
tion) operations, in different ways and throughout time, rather than just 
an instance of complicity,115 engaging indirect responsibility, can thus be 
 
110 ARSIWA Commentary (n 64) 47.  
111 A Palladino, ‘Cercate i guardacoste libici? Telefonate a Roma: 06/…’, Il Fatto 
Quotidiano (18 April 2018) <www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/in-edicola/articoli/ 
2018/04/18/cercate-i-guardacoste-libici-telefonate-a-roma-06/4299475/>. For a visual 
reconstruction of events occurring on 6 November 2017 between Sea Watch and the 
Libyan Coast Guard in a rescue operation coordinated by Italy, see ‘“It’s an Act of 
Murder”: How Europe Outsources Suffering as Migrants Drown’ New York Times (26 
December 2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/26/opinion/europe-
migrant-crisis-mediterranean-libya.html>. For the general trend, see Mare Clausum (n 
95). 
112 ARSIWA Commentary (n 64) 69 (emphasis added) regarding art 17 ARSIWA 
on ‘direction and control exercised over the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act’ (heading). 
113 Confirming this finding, see IMO, Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
Project submitted by Italy, NCSR 5/INF.17 (15 December 2017), Executive Summary: 
‘This document provides information on the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Centre (LMRCC) Project, an initiative run by the Italian Coast Guard and funded by the 
European Commission, with the aim of conducting a feasibility study in order to estab-
lish a Libyan MRCC […]’, which, for the time being, is lacking (emphasis added). 
114 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) [1986] ICJ 
Rep. 14, 62 and 64–65, paras 109 and 115. 
115 Making this case, see G Pascale, ‘“Esternalizzazione” delle frontiere in chiave 
antimigratoria e responsabilità internazionale dell’Italia e dell’UE per complicità nelle 
gross violations dei diritti umani commesse in Libia’ (2018) 13 Studi sull’integrazione 
europea 413. See also R Mackenzie-Gray Scott, ‘Torture in Libya and Questions of EU 
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characterised as a breach entailing direct responsibility, consisting of a 
‘composite act’. Article 15 ARSIWA establishes that an international 
obligation (of non-refoulement, for instance, and of non-arbitrary inter-
ference with the right to leave) may indeed be violated via ‘a series of 
actions or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful’. The financing or 
training of the LYCG alone may be harmless and perfectly licit, but, 
when taken together and alongside the infiltration of the command-
and-control chain of the LYCG by the Italian Navy, the whole, in light 
of the final outcome of pull-backs, becomes an illicit under internation-
al law.  
Italian jurisdiction may indeed be engaged not only in relation to ac-
tion occurring within its territory and in other areas subject to its ‘effec-
tive control’, but, as the Human Rights Committee has stated, also re-
garding conduct ‘having a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact on 
the right[s] […] of individuals [abroad]’.116 The obligation to respect 
and protect human rights extends beyond territorial domain to all per-
sons subject to its jurisdiction, that is, to ‘all persons over whose enjoy-
ment of the right[s] [concerned] it exercises power’, including ‘persons 
located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, whose 
[rights are] nonetheless impacted by its military and other activities’ – 
the transfer of money, equipment and enforcement capacity thus ac-
quiring a significance of its own as a possible trigger of independent re-
sponsibility for wrongful conduct.117 Not only the aiding and abetting of 
human rights violations is of relevance, whatever the form the assistance 
provided to the LYCG may take (whether commercial, financial, politi-
cal, or logistical), but also actions (or omissions) that impede the effec-
tive enjoyment of human rights – counting the right to leave any coun-
try, to seek protection from harm, and to non-refoulement – matter too, 
from a legal perspective.118 Following the Legal Service of the European 
 
Member States Complicity’, EJILTalk! (11 January 2018) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/ 
torture-in-libya-and-questions-of-eu-member-state-complicity/>.   
116 Mutatis mutandis HRC General Comment (n 81) para 22. 
117 ibid. para 63 (emphasis added). For a similar reasoning by the Strasbourg Court, 
see Al-Skeini (n 68); Jaloud v The Netherlands, App no 47708/08 (ECtHR 20 November 
2014); Chiragov (n 93); Catan (n 94); Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia, App no 
48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004).  
118 Cf A Brown, ‘To Complicity… and Beyond! Passive Assistance and Positive Ob-
ligations in International law’ (2016) 27 Hague YB Intl L 133. 
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Parliament in the context of its viability analysis of ‘disembarkation 
platforms’, engagement in any formal or informal arrangement with 
third countries – including Libya – to finance or contribute to the func-
tioning of externalized structures of migration control ‘have to respect 
the prescriptions of the relevant provisions of international law’119 – 
presumably including those under the ECHR, the ICCPR and general 
customary norms.120 Failure to do so flouts the obligations concerned. 
Direct perpetration of an international wrong is not a pre-requisite for 
legal responsibility. Indirect contraventions – including via proxy – in-
cur liability as well.121 
Distance-creation, through the ‘rulification’ of ‘irresponsibility’ in 
legal texts or self-seeking effectuations, does not do away with interna-
tional obligations, nor does it legitimize the suffering it provokes. The 
EU and its Member States must come to recognise the predictable ef-
fect and implications of their externalization agenda. And, alongside the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, acknowledge that, as currently de-
signed, their ‘migration policies can amount to ill-treatment’.122 Actual-
ly, ‘[t]he primary cause for the massive abuse suffered by migrants [...] 
is neither migration itself, nor organised crime [...] but the growing 
tendency of States to base their official migration policies and practices 
on deterrence, criminalisation and discrimination’.123 It is this distinct 
strategy that causes border-induced displacement, breaches human 
rights obligations and triggers international legal responsibility.124 
 
119  Opinion of the Legal Service of the European Parliament (n 52) para 42. 
120  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [1966] 999 UNTS 171 
(ICCPR). See also HRC (n 81). 
121 For an elaboration, see V Moreno-Lax, ‘Responsibility by Proxy and the Func-
tional Approach to Jurisdiction: Closing Accountability Gaps in Multi-actor Constella-
tions of Extraterritorial Cooperation’, Conference Paper, REF-MIG Project, Oxford 
(10 November 2018). 
122 ‘Migration Policies Can Amount to Ill-Treatment and Torture, UN Rights Ex-
pert Warns’, OHCHR News, 1 March 2018, <www.ohchr.org/EN/News 
Events/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22739&LangID=E>.   
123 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, Nils Melzer, UN Doc A/HRC/37/50 (2018) para 
64(d). 
124 In this line, see I Mann, V Moreno-Lax and O Schatz, ‘Time to Investigate Eu-
ropean Agents for Crimes against Migrants in Libya’, EJILTalk! (29 March 2018) 
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4.  Conclusion: ‘Rulification’ as the co-option of protection 
 
‘Rulification’ does not represent a paradigm shift in European poli-
tics, but rather an up-scaling of the logic observable also in proposals 
pursued from the 1980s and onwards and which have led to the integra-
tion of the concepts of ‘first country of arrival’, ‘safe third country’ and 
maritime interdiction within the legal architecture of the common bor-
ders and asylum acquis, the primary purpose of which has been the 
avoidance of asylum seekers on EU territory. It is the abuse and exploi-
tation entrenched within externalization strategies that engenders bor-
der-induced displacement in Europe’s border-region. With EU Mem-
ber States viewing the opening up of legal escape routes as an irrational 
concession, the side-effects of externalization are exacerbated as the sys-
temic logic of asymmetric, diffused, and denied responsibility for dis-
placed persons is reproduced further and further away from Europe, 
and closer and closer to the repressive regimes people attempt to escape 
from. 
The reactionary and regionalist assumptions underpinning external-
ization arguments and practices tell a securitized tale of displacements 
constantly generated and managed far removed from European territo-
ry and agency. However, distance-creation strategies, whether ethical, 
spatial, or legal, belong to the category of ‘policies based on deterrence, 
militarization and extraterritoriality’, denounced by UN Special Rap-
porteurs and others, ‘which implicitly or explicitly tolerate [and perpet-
uate] the risk of migrant deaths as part of an effective control of en-
try’.125 As the previous sections demonstrate, the structural nature of ex-
ternalization problematizes traditional assumptions and debates in im-
migration ethics and politics. It traps migrants in a ‘vicious circle’ of 
more control, more danger, and more displacement, where they must 
rely on facilitators to escape life-threatening perils.126  
But smuggling and trafficking is the consequence, rather than the 
cause, of suffering. Suffering is embedded in the externalization system 
 
125 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Agnès Callamard, UN Doc A/72/335 (2018) para 
10. 
126 H de Haas, ‘Borders beyond Control’, International Migration Institute Net-
work (January 2015) <www.imi-n.org/imi-archive/news/borders-beyond-control-blog-
by-hein-de-haas>. 
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by design through the vehicle of ‘rulification’, which serves to launder 
the pernicious (and perfectly foreseeable) impact of extra-
territorialised/externalised coercion into ‘law-ified’ (and purportedly 
unintended) side effects. At the same time, the European transfer of 
equipment and capacity for control outwards also risks undermining 
processes of accountability and democratic legitimacy in regions bor-
dering Europe. And the ‘rulification’ of border-induced displacement 
does not make these implications any more palatable. In the words of 
UN Special Rapporteur Agnès Callamard, it is simply ‘not acceptable’ 
to deter entry by endangering life.127 The fallacy of coercion-based pro-
tection needs to give way to an ethically grounded and legally sustaina-
ble rights-honouring paradigm. This is not to contest the legal existence 
of borders or their enforcement, but to challenge the legitimacy of 
mechanisms through which they are presently enacted in a manner in-
compatible with the most basic requirements of international law. 
  
 
127 A Callamard (n 125) para 59. 
